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Abstract: Why can I tell you that I ran for five minutes but not that I *ran to the
store for five minutes? Why can we talk about five pounds of books but not about
*five pounds of book? What keeps you from saying *sixty degrees Celsius of water
when you can say sixty inches of water? And what goes wrong when I complain
that *all the ants in my kitchen are numerous? The constraints on these construc-
tions involve concepts that are generally studied separately: aspect, plural and
mass reference, measurement, distributivity, and collectivity. This paper pro-
vides a unified perspective on these domains and gives a single answer to the
questions above in the framework of algebraic event semantics.
Keywords: algebraic semantics, aspect, boundedness, collectivity, distributivity,
mass, measurement, mereology, monotonicity, plural, partitives, telicity
1 Introduction
This paper presents a theory that builds connections between three domains
which are often addressed separately: aspect, measurement, and distributivity.
I aim to provide a synthesis of several previous and novel ideas in the unifying
framework of algebraic event semantics. I suggest that a number of phenomena
in these domains can be connected in this framework through a novel higher-
order property, stratified reference. This property is both general enough to
connect and subsume familiar notions, and formally precise enough to transfer
theoretical insights across the literature.
This paper extends and builds on algebraic semantic work on the close
parallels between the nominal and verbal domains, such as Link (1983), Bach
(1986) and Krifka (1998). Stratified reference pulls together several semantic
oppositions closely associated with the domains under consideration. These
are the singular-plural and count-mass oppositions in the nominal domain;
the intensive-extensive opposition in the domain of measurement; and in the
verbal domain, the telic-atelic opposition, the collective-distributive opposition,
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and what I will call the numerous-gather opposition, which involves different
kinds of collective predicates.
Singular, telic, and collective predicates are delimited or bounded in ways
that plural, mass, atelic, and distributive predicates are not. This raises the
question how to formally characterize the difference between the two concepts
boundedness and unboundedness. Answering this question amounts to specify-
ing what property a predicate needs to have in order to qualify as atelic,
distributive, plural, or to have mass reference. It is not obvious that there should
be a single property that is shared by all these predicates. I will show, however,
that it is indeed possible to isolate such a property. The identity of this property
can be determined by analyzing a number of nominal and verbal constructions
which are sensitive to the semantic oppositions in question, and which are
central to the study of aspect, measurement, and distributivity. Some examples
of these constructions are for-adverbials, which distinguish atelic from telic
predicates (1); pseudopartitives, which distinguish plurals and mass nouns
from singular count nouns (2); the word each, which distinguishes distributive
from collective predicates (3); and the word all, which distinguishes between
two classes of collective predicates that can be roughly characterized as invol-
ving collective action versus cardinality checks (4). I refer to these constructions
collectively as distributive constructions.
(1) a. John ran for five minutes. atelic
b. *John ran to the store for five minutes. *telic
(2) a. thirty pounds of books plural
b. thirty liters of water mass
c. *thirty pounds of book *singular; ok as coerced mass
(3) a. The boys each walked. distributive
b. The boys each met. *collective
(4) a. All the boys gathered in the hallway. collective action
b. *All the boys were numerous. *cardinality check
The main claim of this paper is that these constructions all exclude bounded
predicates through stratified reference, a higher-order property (a property of
predicates) that is parametrized in order to account for the differences between
the constructions in question. Stratified reference requires a predicate that holds
of a certain entity or event to also hold of its parts along a certain dimension and
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down to a certain level of granularity. Dimension and granularity are understood
as parameters which different distributive constructions can set to different
values.
The dimension parameter specifies the way in which the predicate in ques-
tion is distributed. Different settings of this parameter allow one and the same
predicate to be atelic but not distributive, for example, or vice versa. When the
dimension parameter is set to time, stratified reference applies to atelic but not
to telic predicates, as in (1). When it is set to a measure function like weight or
volume, stratified reference applies to mass and plural nouns but not to count
nouns, as in (2). When it is set to a thematic role like agent, stratified reference
applies to distributive but not to collective predicates, as in (3), or to certain
kinds of collective predicates but not others, as in (4).
The granularity parameter specifies the size of the parts in question as
measured along the relevant dimension. Depending on how it is set, the parts
in question must typically be either mereological atoms (singular entities) or else
very small in size. This parameter accounts, among other things, for the differ-
ences between distributive constructions over discrete (count) domains, such as
each and all constructions, and those over domains involving continuous dimen-
sions, such as for-adverbials and pseudopartitives.
The names dimension, granularity, and—as I will explain later—stratified refer-
ence are derived from a visual metaphor, which is based on the idea that indivi-
duals, substances, and events occupy regions in an abstract space. The dimensions
of this space include the familiar spatial and temporal dimensions as well as any
measure functions and thematic roles that happen to be defined for the entity in
question. To understand a thematic role as a dimension, assume that the indivi-
duals that correspond to these roles are ordered in an arbitrary but fixed way.
To give a few examples, an object whose weight is large corresponds to a
region with a large extent along the weight dimension. An event whose agent is a
plural entity corresponds to a region with a large extent along the agent dimen-
sion, while an event whose agent is singular corresponds to a region which is not
extended along the agent dimension at all. A temporally and spatially punctual
event whose thematic roles are all singular entities corresponds to a point. A
temporally and spatially punctual event that has plural entities as its agent and
theme and singular entities as its other thematic roles corresponds to an infinitely
thin rectangle that is extended along the agent and theme dimensions.
Section 2 introduces stratified reference and shows how it characterizes the
opposition between atelic and telic predicates, both in time and space. Section 3
uses stratified reference to characterize several oppositions that are relevant in
pseudopartitives, including those concerning singular and plural predicates,
count and mass predicates, and different kinds of measure functions. Section 4
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uses stratified reference to formulate meaning postulates that characterize the
difference between distributive and collective predicates, and differences within
the class of collective predicates. The paper closes with a discussion of open
problems and possible avenues for further research.
2 Aspect
In this section I introduce and motivate stratified reference, and I show how it
can be used to characterize the telic/atelic opposition. This opposition is lin-
guistically relevant because it is needed in order to describe the behavior of a
number of aspectually sensitive constructions. The best-known examples of
these constructions are measure adverbials, such as for-adverbials, which are
compatible with atelic predicates but not with telic predicates, setting coercion
and reinterpretation aside (Vendler 1957):
(5) a. John walked for five minutes. atelic
b. *John walked to the store for five minutes. telic
For-adverbials are usually contrasted with in-adverbials. In neutral contexts,
they are compatible with telic predicates but not with atelic predicates:
(6) a. John walked for five minutes.
b. *John walked in five minutes.
These are not the only aspectually sensitive adverbials. For example, until is
also sensitive to the atelic-telic distinction (Karttunen 1974; Hitzeman 1991, 1997).
(7) a. John ate away at his sandwich until Mary arrived. atelic
b. #John finished his sandwich until Mary arrived. telic
Similar generalizations have been suggested to underlie the behavior of
French adverbial beaucoup (“a lot”, Doetjes 2007) and also of German seit
(“since”), although its interaction with the Perfect makes this more difficult to
observe (von Stechow 2002).
While most discussions of aspect focus on its interaction with tense and
time, measure adverbials can be temporal as well as spatial (Moltmann 1991;
Gawron 2005). Spatial for-adverbials test for a spatial counterpart of atelicity but
work analogously to temporal for-adverbials otherwise. For example, the pre-
dicate meander is spatially atelic because, roughly speaking, every part of a
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meandering road itself meanders (so long as it is not too small; I come back to
this point below). For this reason, it is compatible with spatial for-adverbials but
not with spatial in-adverbials:
(8) a. The road meanders for a mile.
b. *The road meanders in a mile. (cf. Gawron 2005)
As another example, (9a) has a stative interpretation on which it describes a crack
whose width gradually increases over a stretch of five meters. By contrast,
example (9b) cannot mean that the crack gradually widens by 2 cm over a stretch
of five meters. It only has an irrelevant interpretation on which the crack’s width
over a stretch of five meters is 2 cm more than elsewhere, which arguably
corresponds to result-oriented interpretations of for-adverbials like The Sherriff
jailed Robin Hood for four years.
(9) a. The crack widens for/*in 5 meters. spatially atelic
b. The crack widens 2 cm in/*for 5 meters. spatially telic
Some other adverbials also behave like spatial for-adverbials, as shown in the
examples in (10) from Moltmann (1991).
(10) a. Worldwide children/#a child/#1000 children suffer(s) from hunger.
b. Throughout the country the increased air pollution caused protests /#a
protest/#the protests.
From this and similar examples, I conclude that spatial for-adverbials test for a
spatial counterpart of atelicity. The following minimal pair shows that spatial and
temporal for-adverbials give rise to different interpretations, as expected. Suppose
that John, an employee of a department store, is standing fifty meters away from
the store in a parking lot. He has a few hundred shopping carts, which he is
supposed to push to the store. Since these are too many carts to push all at once,
he goes back and forth between the parking lot and the store, and each time he
takes a few carts with him. After fifty minutes, his shift is over and he goes home.
In this situation, (11a) is true (on an iterative interpretation of its verb phrase), but
(11b) is not, even though the distance he travels each time is fifty meters.
(11) a. John pushed carts all the way to the store for fifty minutes.
temporally atelic
b. John pushed carts all the way to the store for fifty meters.
spatially telic
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The difference between (11a) and (11b) can be explained on the assumption that
for fifty minutes checks for a property that is parametrized for time, while for fifty
meters checks for a property that is parametrized for space. More generally, the
contrast between spatial and temporal for-adverbials supports a parametrized
notion of the telic-atelic opposition, where the parameter is set either to time or
to a spatial dimension.
The predicate John pushed carts all the way to the store may be used to
describe a complex sum event like the one that contains everything described in
the scenario above. Such an event is depicted in the space-time diagrams in
Figure 1, which builds on the spatial metaphor I described above and attempts
to convey the intuition behind the explanation I will provide. The left-hand
diagram corresponds to (11a) and the right-hand one to (11b).
Both sentences require the predicate to hold at very small intervals that are parts
of the interval that the for-adverbial introduces. In (11a), this interval is a fifty-
minute time span. As long as each subinterval of this time span is the runtime of
an event that satisfies the predicate John pushed carts all the way to the store,
(11a) is predicted to be acceptable. The events marked with a checkmark in
Figure 1 satisfy this predicate in the scenario above. In (11b), the interval is a
fifty-meter long path. Most of the subintervals of this path do not contain the
location of the store. That (11b) is unacceptable can then be explained by the
assumption that an event whose location does not contain the store does not
satisfy the predicate John pushed carts all the way to the store. For example,
the events marked with an X on the right-hand diagram of Figure 1 do not
satisfy this predicate. Thus, we may say that the iterative interpretation of push






















extent along path = 50 meters
Figure 1: John pushed carts to the store is temporally atelic but spatially telic.
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The interpretation of predicates as atelic or telic may vary based on a
number of factors. For example, a given predicate that is otherwise not compa-
tible with for-adverbials may become compatible with them, and therefore atelic,
when it is contextually restricted to events of a certain kind. For example, push
carts all the way to the store may become spatially atelic when it is restricted to
events that can be subdivided along the relevant spatial dimension (the path to
the store). H.-M. Gärtner (p.c.) offers a relevant example of a scenario in which
both (11a) and (11b) may be judged acceptable and true. Suppose that the
department store is one hundred meters wide, and that along the store’s wall
there are carts every few meters that are at some distance from the wall. John
walks along the store and on a stretch of fifty meters he pushes carts all the way
to the wall. In this scenario, (11b) is acceptable and true. If we also suppose that
John works at a rate of just one meter per minute, so that he is done after fifty
minutes, (11a) is acceptable and true as well. In this paper, I will not formally
represent this kind of contextual restriction, since my goal here is to develop a
formal notion that adequately captures atelicity, and not to give a comprehen-
sive theory of aspectual composition. For such a theory, see for example Krifka
(1998).
According to one influential theory of atelicity, a predicate is atelic—and can
combine with for-adverbials—just in case it has the subinterval property
(Bennett and Partee 1972; Dowty 1979: 334). This property holds of any predicate
P such that whenever P holds at an interval t, it also holds at every subinterval
of t, all the way down to instants. Figuratively speaking, the subinterval prop-
erty requires that any event in the denotation of a predicate that has this
property can be divided into infinitely thin “temporal layers” that are also in
the denotation of this atelic predicate. For example, on this view, the predicate
walk is atelic because we can “zoom in” to any part of the runtime of a walking
event to find a part of it which is another walking event. These shorter walking
events are plausibly considered parts, or subevents, of the longer walking
events. In the following, I use τ for the function that maps events to the temporal
intervals at which they occur. This function is variously called runtime or
temporal trace. These runtimes are time spans located on the historical time
axis. I assume that these time spans in turn have durations. An event today and
another equally long one tomorrow have distinct runtimes but the same dura-
tion. I use  both for the parthood (inclusion) relation between intervals and for
the parthood relation between events and other entities.
(12) "e walk eð Þ ! "t t  τ eð Þ ! 9e0 walk e0ð Þ ^ e0  e ^ t ¼ τ e0ð Þ½ ½ ½ 
(Whenever walk holds of an event e, then at every subinterval of the
runtime of e, there is a subevent of which walk also holds.)
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The subinterval property has several deficiencies. For one thing, it hard-codes the
role of time in the definition of aspect, and must therefore be generalized before it
can be used for spatial for-adverbials. Another deficiency is the well-known “mini-
mal-parts problem”. The subinterval property requires a predicate to be true at all
subintervals, even infinitely short ones. Not all atelic predicates satisfy this stringent
criterion. It is sufficient for the predicate to be true at length intervals that count as
very small relative to the length of the bigger interval. To mention a classical
example, given that any waltzing event takes at least three steps to unfold, example
(13a) does not entail that John and Mary waltzed within every single moment of the
hour, only that the hour can be divided into very short subintervals such that they
waltzed at each of them (Taylor 1977; Dowty 1979: 171). The same observation,
mutatis mutandis, can be made for cases that involve spatial for-adverbials, such as
example (13b). Here, it is the spatial interval in question which is required to consist
of very small parts such that each of which is the spatial extent of a waltzing event.
(13) a. John and Mary waltzed for an hour.
b. John and Mary waltzed for a couple of meters.
The minimal length in question is not fixed once and for all, as shown by the
following attested examples:
(14) The Chinese people have created abundant folk arts, such as paper-cuttings,
acrobatics, etc., passed on from generation to generation for thousands of
years.1
(15) Ded’leg says: How i [sic] stop a macro for 1 sec? Cog says: By creating a
script that will loop for 3,600 [sic] milliseconds … 2
The verb phrases in these examples are clearly atelic since they can be modified
by a for-adverbial. The minimal duration of an event in the denotation of pass on
from generation to generation is much longer than that of an event denoted by
loop. This mirrors the relation between thousands of years and 3,600 milliseconds.
This suggests that the minimal-length requirements imposed by for-adverbials are
relative to the measure phrases they contain.
While it has long been accepted that the subinterval property is an idealization
and that it must be relaxed to account for such examples, there is no consensus on
the best way to do so. For reviews of various proposals, see for example Krifka
1 Attested example (http://www.twinbridge.com/detail.aspx?ID=315).
2 Attested example (http://web.archive.org/web/20120429171708/http://www.wowmacroswarcraft.
com/faq/).
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(1986: Ch. 2) and Mollá-Aliod (1997: Ch. 4). Here I will develop one particular
approach. I defend it against alternatives in Champollion (2010, to appear (b):
Chs. 5 and 6). Here is a brief sketch of the problems that some of these alternative
approaches face. Hinrichs (1985: 235) proposes that (13a) requires every proper
subinterval of the hour to be a subinterval of the runtime of some waltzing event
which is a proper part of the hour-long waltzing event in question. As the length of
these proper subintervals approaches one hour, the proper parts encompass more
and more of the whole event, which has various undesirable consequences.
Moltmann (1991) argues for a departure from classical extensional mereology and
proposes that (13a) requires John and Mary to waltz at every “relevant or contex-
tually determined” part of the hour in question, but does not say much about what
relevant parts are and does not present a formal model. Krifka (1986, 1989, 1992,
1998) and Kratzer (2007) characterize for-adverbials in terms of variations of the
notion of divisive reference, which holds of a predicate P if every part of any event in
P is also in P. In other words, the parthood relation between temporal intervals is
replaced by a parthood relation between events. Their approach does not make
explicit reference to time or space and cannot be easily extended to do so, which
makes it difficult to distinguish between temporal and spatial atelicity.
In the metaphor I have developed, we can diagnose the problem with the
subinterval property as follows. The subinterval property requires that any event
that satisfies a property P can be cut along the temporal dimension into infinitely
thin “layers” each of which satisfies P. While for-adverbials do seem to constrain
the event layers to be very thin, they do not have to be infinitely thin. I will call these
very thin layers strata and I will amend the subinterval property in a way that will
lead to stratified reference. I have chosen the names strata and stratified reference to
remind the reader of geological strata, the layers of rock which can be observed in
geological formations in places such as the Grand Canyon. A geological stratum can
be just a few inches thick, though not infinitely thin, and yet extend over hundreds
of thousands of square miles. This aspect is mirrored in the present theory, where
strata are constrained to be very thin along one dimension, but may be arbitrarily
large as measured in any other dimension. This feature of the theory not only helps
capture the distinction between temporal and spatial measure adverbials. It will
also become important later, when I will use stratified reference to model different
properties at the same time (e.g. atelicity and distributivity) that may not always
hold of the same predicates. I will assume that individual constructions set the
dimension parameter in different ways when they impose constraints on their
constituents. For example, temporal for-adverbials require stratified reference
along the temporal dimension only. As far as they are concerned, while the parts
of relevant events must be short, or thin, in the temporal dimension, they may still
have plural entities as agents or themes, they may be extended in space, and so on.
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The subinterval property says that an atelic predicate distributes along the
time dimension down to intervals of infinitely short length. This has turned out
to be too strong. Instead, as we have seen, atelic predicates distribute along a
certain dimension (which may be either temporal or spatial) down to intervals of
a certain length or granularity. To model this, I will add a dimension parameter
and a granularity parameter to the subinterval property. I will use the dimension
parameter to specify the spatial or temporal dimension, and I will set the
granularity parameter to a small but nonzero value in order to maintain the
spirit of the subinterval property while avoiding the minimal-parts problem. In
my formalization, I will make use of the star operator known from the literature
on plural semantics (Link 1983). This operator is defined as follows. I use ¯C to
refer to the mereological sum of the elements of the set C. I assume classical
extensional mereology, which means among other things that every nonempty
set of entities has a unique sum. For a general introduction to mereology in
formal semantics, see Champollion and Krifka (to appear).
(16) Definition of the star operator
For any nonempty set of entities P, let P ¼def A j 9C A ¼ ¯C ^ C  P½ f g
(A is the sum of all the elements of a subset C of P.)
Intuitively, x 2 P means that x consists of one or more parts such that P holds
of every one of these parts. To put it differently, if x 2 P then either P holds of x
itself, or there is a way to divide x into parts that form a subset of P. I will switch
freely between predicate-argument notation, set membership notation, and
lambda abstraction notation. Thus, the following three statements are equiva-
lent: (i) P(x); (ii) x 2 P; and (iii) x 2  λy:P yð Þ.
I will use the following conventions for basic types: t for propositions, e for
ordinary objects, v for events, i for intervals, d for degrees (of height, weight,
volume, speed, etc.), and n for numbers. I use the symbols x, y, z, x′, y′, z′ and so
on for variables that range over ordinary objects, e, e′, e″ for events, t, t′, t″ for
temporal intervals, l, l′, l″ for spatial extents (locations), d for degrees and n, n′,
n″ for numbers. Sometimes I will use variables that can range over entities of
different types. I will write α to range over any basic type.
In order to model different levels of granularity, I will assume that there is a
vague predicate ε that takes a set K of type α; th i and an entity x of type β, where
α and β range over at least the following basic types: temporal intervals, spatial
extents, degrees, and numbers. I assume that ε Kð Þ xð Þ holds just in case x counts
as very small as compared to the comparison class K. For example,
ε λt hours tð Þ ¼ 1½ ð Þ t0ð Þ is true just in case t′ is very small with respect to (the set
of all temporal intervals whose length is) one hour. For now, I will assume that ε
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is only defined if α ¼ β, since it will generally not be necessary to compare
across basic types. In Section 4, we will have occasion to relax this requirement.
Using the ε predicate, we can formally express what it means for the predicate
waltz to have the property we have discussed above:
(17) "e waltz eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 waltz e
0ð Þ ^
ε λt hours tð Þ ¼ 1½ ð Þ τ e0ð Þð Þ
  
This formula can be paraphrased as follows:
(18) Every waltzing event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which
is a waltzing event whose runtime is very short compared with one hour.
I will use the formulation “can be divided into one or more parts” frequently. An
equivalent formulation that is perhaps easier to understand, but that does not
match the structure of the formula as closely, is the following:
(19) Every waltzing event whose runtime is not very short compared with one
hour can be divided into waltzing events whose runtime are very short
compared with one hour.
Let us say that waltz has stratified reference with respect to the dimension runtime
and the granularity ε λt hours tð Þ ¼ 1½ ð Þ (which is true of any interval very short as
compared to an hour), formally: SRτ;ε λt hours tð Þ¼1½ ð Þ λe:waltz eð Þð Þ, just in case (17) is
true. By abstracting from this example, we arrive at the following definition:
(20) Stratified reference (Definition)
SRf ;ε Kð Þ Pð Þ ¼def "x P xð Þ ! x 2  λy
P yð Þ ^
ε Kð Þ f yð Þð Þ
!" #
This definition says that stratified reference applies to a predicate P just in case the
following is true: whenever P holds of an entity or event x, there is a way to divide x
into strata y1, y2, etc. such that each yi is mapped by the function f to a value which
counts as very small with respect to the comparison class K. This is illustrated in
Figure 2, where the vertical axis represents the dimension f. In case f is instantiated
with runtime, stratified reference approximately amounts to the subinterval prop-
erty, except that the minimal-parts problem is avoided.
I propose that being temporally atelic means having stratified reference with
respect to time and a suitably instantiated granularity parameter. For-adverbials
require stratified reference, not the subinterval property. For concreteness, I will
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assume that this requirement is a presupposition and I will represent it as a
definedness requirement, but nothing hinges on these assumptions. (It could
also be seen as a kind of selectional restriction, for example.) I write λx : ’ : ψ
for the partial function that is defined for all x such that ’ holds, and that
returns ψ wherever the function is defined (Heim and Kratzer 1998: Ch. 4). My
entry for for is as follows:
(21) for½ ½  ¼ λτ vih iλM ith iλP vth iλe : SRτ;ε Mð Þ Pð Þ : P eð Þ ^M τ eð Þð Þ
This entry combines with a temporal or spatial trace function τ (depending on
whether the for-adverbial is temporal or spatial), which we may assume is pro-
vided by a silent head. It then combines with a measure phrase M (such as an hour,
which I assume denotes a set of temporal intervals) and a verb phrase P (such as
waltz, a set of events) and presupposes that P has stratified reference with respect
to the two specified parameters, in this case dimension τ (runtime) and granularity
ε λt:hours tð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ. This presupposition tolerates the possibility that very short
waltzing events are not infinitely divisible into even shorter ones, and is therefore
satisfied even though waltz may not have the subinterval property. This is sum-
marized in (22). I will provide similar summaries throughout the rest of this paper.
(22) waltz for an hour
Satisfied presupposition: SRτ;ε λt hours tð Þ¼1½ ð Þ λe:waltz eð Þð Þ, that is:
"e waltz eð Þ ! e 2 λe0 waltz e
0ð Þ ^
ε λt hours tð Þ ¼ 1½ ð Þ τ e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every waltzing event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is











x Figure 2: Stratified reference.
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By assuming that different for-adverbials set the granularity parameter of the
stratified reference conditions that they impose to different values, we can
model the fact that atelicity is a relative notion, as seen in examples (14) and
(15). The analyses of these examples are as follows:
(23) pass on from generation to generation for thousands of years
Satisfied presupposition:
SRτ;ε λt½thousands years tð Þð Þð Þ λe:pass:on:from:generation:to:generation eð Þð Þ ,
"e
"
pass:on:from:generation:to:generation eð Þ !
e 2  λe0 pass:on:from:generation:to:generation e
0ð Þ ^
ε λt thousands years tð Þð Þ½ ð Þ τ e0ð Þð Þ
 #
(Every event that can be described as pass on from generation to generation
can be divided into one or more parts, each of which can be described as
pass on from generation to generation and has a runtime that is very short
compared with thousands of years.)
(24) loop for 3,600 milliseconds
Satisfied presupposition: SRτ;ε λt milliseconds tð Þ¼3600½ ð Þ λe:loop eð Þð Þ ,
"e loop eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 loop e
0ð Þ ^
ε λt milliseconds tð Þ ¼ 3600½ ð Þ τ e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every looping event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is a
looping event whose runtime is very short compared with 3,600milliseconds.)
Again, these presuppositions are plausibly satisfied. Even though at least
example (23) does not involve a property that has the subinterval property, it
passes muster because the granularity parameter is set to a very coarse level.
Finally, stratified reference can also be used to model spatial aspect.
Examples like (8a) (The road meanders for a mile) do not require the road in
question to meander throughout its entire length, just like the sentence John
walked for an hour does not require John to walk throughout his entire lifetime.
To represent this fact, I assume that the relevant sentences involve underlying
states and that these states may be spatiotemporally extended, just like events
(Parsons 1987). The state that verifies The road meanders will have the same
spatial extent as the meandering part of the road. These states play the same
role in the compositional process as events, so I represent them with the same
variable e. I assume that a state is mapped to its spatial extent by a function
I will write as σ (Zwarts 2006). Given this, we can translate a spatial for-adverbial
as in (25). This translation imposes a stratified reference requirement that is
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parametrized for σ (spatial extent) instead of τ (time) and is otherwise equivalent
to my translation of the temporal for-adverbial. Other spatial measure adver-
bials, such as worldwide and throughout the country in (10), can be represented
in similar ways.
(25) for a mile½ ½ 
¼ λP vth iλe : SRσ;ε λl miles lð Þ¼1½ ð Þ Pð Þ: P eð Þ ^miles σ eð Þð Þ ¼ 1
With this in place, we can easily capture the requirement of spatial for-adverbials
and related expressions, as the following examples show:
(26) meander for a mile
Satisfied presupposition: SRσ;ε λl milesðlÞ¼1½ ð Þðλe:meanderðeÞÞ ,
"e meander eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 meander e
0ð Þ ^
ε λl miles lð Þ ¼ 1½ ð Þ σ e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every meandering state can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is a meandering state whose spatial extent is very small compared
with one mile.)
(27) cause protests throughout the country
Satisfied presupposition:
SRσ;ε λl l¼σ the:countryð Þ½ ð Þ cause eð Þ ^ protest theme eð Þð Þ ,ð
"e
"
cause eð Þ ^ protest theme eð Þð Þ !
e 2  λe0 cause e
0ð Þ ^ protest theme e0ð Þð Þ ^
ε λl l ¼ σ the:countryð Þ½ ð Þ σ e0ð Þð Þ
 !#
(Every state of causing protests can be divided into one or more parts, each
of which is a state of causing protests whose spatial extent is very small
compared with the spatial extent of the country.)
To summarize this section, for-adverbials and related constructions are sensitive to
the temporal/spatial opposition and to different granularities in ways that motivate
an appropriate generalization of the subinterval property. This generalization,
stratified reference, builds on the basic intuition behind algebraic semantic
accounts of aspect – namely, that atelicity can be defined in terms of a predicate
applying to the parts of an event in question – but generalizes it by adding
parameters that allow us to explicitly model varying dimensions and granularities.
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3 Measurement
Now that we have seen how stratified reference characterizes the telic-atelic
opposition and allows us to avoid the minimal-parts problem and generalize to
spatial aspect, let us turn to measurement in natural language. Several measure-
ment-related constructions turn out to be sensitive to a number of oppositions
that can all be characterized using stratified reference. Aside from measure
adverbials like for an hour, I will focus on pseudopartitives (Selkirk 1977). As
the following examples illustrate, pseudopartitives can be used to talk about
substances and events in terms of their measurement along various dimensions
(Krifka 1998; Schwarzschild 2006):
(28) a. five pounds of rice weight
b. five liters of water volume
c. five hours of talks temporal trace
d. five miles of railroad tracks spatial extent
There are two semantic parallels between pseudopartitives and for-adverbials.
First, both reject predicates that fail to apply to the parts of the entities and
events in their denotation. This category includes telic predicates in the case of
for-adverbials, as we have seen in the previous section, and count nouns in the
case of pseudopartitives, as illustrated in (29). It is not possible to use a
pseudopartitive like the one in (29c) to describe a single book whose weight is
five pounds.
(29) a. five pounds of books
b. five pounds of rice
c. *five pounds of book (unacceptable with “book” as a count noun)
There are several irrelevant interpretations that may be available for (29c) when
the identity of the books in question is not at issue or not recoverable. For
example, it may be interpreted as describing five pounds of books in a situation
where the books are sold by weight, or five pounds of pulp that result from
shredding books. In such cases I assume the count noun book has been coerced
to a mass noun. I leave these interpretations aside since they correspond to
(29b), where a mass noun is used.
The second semantic parallel between pseudopartitives and for-adverbials is
that both of them reject measure functions whose value tends to stay constant
across the parts of any object or event they measure. I will first illustrate this
phenomenon with pseudopartitives and come back to for-adverbials later.
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Examples of such functions are speed, as illustrated by examples (30a) and
(30b), and temperature, as in example (30c).
(30) a. *run (to the store) for five miles an hour
b. five hours of running vs. *five miles an hour of running
c. five inches of water vs. *five degrees (Celsius) of water
Although I will focus on pseudopartitives and for-adverbials in this section,
several other constructions behave analogously. For example, when compara-
tive determiners are used with substance mass nouns, they are underspecified as
to what measure function is involved (Schwarzschild 2006). Thus, more rope can
mean “a longer portion of rope” or “a heavier portion of rope” in different
contexts, depending on what is relevant. It is not possible, however, to use
comparative determiners to compare two amounts of rope by temperature. In
other words, it is not possible to come up with a context in which more rope can
be used felicitously to mean “a warmer portion of rope”. True partitives are
another construction that behaves similarly to pseudopartitives in terms of
rejecting certain measure functions, as shown here:
(31) a. *five degrees Celsius of the water in this bottle *temperature
b. *five miles per hour of my driving *speed
From the examples so far, one might think that certain measure functions are
never acceptable in pseudopartitives. But in fact, measure functions that are
usually unacceptable can be made acceptable when the substance noun is
chosen in the right way, as in the following attested example:
(32) The scientists from Princeton and Harvard universities say just two degrees
Celsius of global warming, which is widely expected to occur in coming
decades, could be enough to inundate the planet.3
Thus, we cannot simply categorize measure functions as acceptable or unaccep-
table per se. What matters is whether they are acceptable on the set denoted by
the substance noun of the pseudopartitive in which they appear.
The fact that pseudopartitives accept certain measure functions but reject
others has previously been linked to the measure-theoretic properties of these
measure functions. As discussed by Krifka (1998) and Schwarzschild (2006), the
3 Attested example (Calgary Herald, December 17, 2009, article: Two degrees is all it takes—
Warming may trigger floods).
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constraint corresponds to a distinction commonly made in measurement theory
and in physics, namely the one between extensive and intensive measure func-
tions. In physics, an extensive measure function is one whose magnitude is
additive for subsystems; an intensive measure function is one whose magnitude
is independent of the extent of the system (Krantz et al. 1971; Mills et al. 2007).
For example, when one considers the system consisting of the water in a tank,
volume is an extensive measure function because it is additive, meaning that the
volume of the water as a whole is greater than the volume of any of its proper
parts. But temperature is intensive with respect to this system because the
temperature of the water as a whole is no different from the temperature of its
proper parts. Krifka (1998) suggests that only extensive measure functions are
admissible in pseudopartitives.
A related notion to extensive measure functions is that of a monotonic
measure function. A function μ is monotonic iff for any two entities a and b in
the physical world, if a is a proper part of b, then μ(a) is less than μ(b).
Schwarzschild (2006) suggests that only monotonic measure functions are admis-
sible in pseudopartitives. For example, volume is monotonic, so we have an
explanation of why thirty liters of water is acceptable. Temperature is not mono-
tonic, which explains why *thirty degrees Celsius of water is not acceptable.
Krifka’s and Schwarzschild’s accounts are attractive, and my theory will
subsume their core idea, but they undergenerate in certain cases like the
following:
(33) Five feet of snow fell on Berlin.
Although (33) is acceptable, height is not monotonic. For example, imagine that
five feet of snow fell on Berlin. The snow that fell on West Berlin is a proper part
of the snow that fell on Berlin. But if height was monotonic, we would conclude
that the height of the snow in West Berlin is less than five feet, contrary to fact.
Schwarzschild (2006: 75) is aware of the problem. From similar examples, he
concludes that pseudopartitives do not test for monotonicity with respect to the
mereological part-whole relation, but only with respect to a part-whole relation
which he sees as contextually supplied. In our example, his assumption would
be that context provides a relation according to which the snow that fell on West
Berlin is not a part of the snow that fell on the entire city. Schwarzschild does
not impose any formal constraints on the contextually supplied part-whole
relation he assumes. However, since many measure functions like temperature
are already correctly ruled out even without replacing the mereological part-
whole relation by a contextually supplied relation, the two relations must
coincide to a large extent, which suggests a certain redundancy.
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To draw on the intuition behind Krifka’s and Schwarzschild’s account
without making this appeal to context necessary, I will relativize monotonicity
to a certain dimension, such as height in the snow example. Furthermore, to
account for the effect that the choice of substance noun matters, I will relativize
it to the property denoted by the substance noun. I will do this by using
stratified reference, which applies to a given property, and which can be para-
metrized for a given dimension. In the previous section, I used the difference
between temporal and spatial for-adverbials as motivation for the dimension
parameter.
Schwarzschild suggests that the telic-atelic opposition can be formalized in
terms of monotonicity. For example, in-adverbials can only combine with telic
predicates because, as he puts it, runtime “is nonmonotonic on the relevant
part-whole relation in the domain given by” that predicate. For him, runtime is a
dimension that is monotonic on the part-whole relation that relates events to
their subevents. So Schwarzschild uses monotonicity to subsume what I have
captured through stratified reference. I propose to go in the opposite direction
and use stratified reference to subsume what Schwarzschild captures through
monotonicity.
Using stratified reference for both measure adverbials and pseudopartitives
predicts a link between the two domains. This prediction is borne out by the
following observation (Champollion 2010: Ch. 7). Those measure functions that
are rejected by pseudopartitives are also rejected by for-adverbials:
(34) a. John waited for five hours. temporal trace
b. The crack widens for five meters. spatial extent
c. *John drove for thirty miles an hour. *speed
d. *The soup boiled for 100 degrees Celsius. *temperature
The following modifications of examples (34c) and (34d) show that these exam-
ples cannot be ruled out on the grounds that events are not the kinds of things
that have speeds and temperatures.
(35) a. John drove (at) thirty miles an hour. speed
b. The soup boiled at 100 degrees Celsius. temperature
So it is really something about for-adverbials, and not just about verbal mod-
ification in general, that rules out intensive measure functions like speed and
temperature.
Just as we did in the case of pseudopartitives, we can identify properties
which make it possible to use measure functions that are otherwise incompatible
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with for-adverbials. The following attested example shows this for the case of
temperature:
(36) The sample continued to cool for several degrees to point N and then
suddenly increased to a temperature between the transition points of Form
I and Form II with no indication of the presence of Form III.4
These facts about for-adverbials provide further justification for the decision to
link the domains of aspect and measurement via stratified reference. On the
assumption that pseudopartitives give rise to the same kinds of parametrized
presuppositions as temporal and spatial for-adverbials do, the relevant exam-
ples can be ruled out because the presuppositions that stratified reference
generates for them can plausibly be assumed to fail:
(37) *drive for 30 miles per hour
Failed presupposition: SRspeed;ε λd mph dð Þ¼30½ ð Þ λe:drive eð Þð Þ ,
"e drive eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 drive e
0ð Þ ^
ε λd mph dð Þ ¼ 30½ ð Þ speed e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every driving event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is a
driving event whose speed is very slow compared with thirty miles per hour.)
(38) *boil for 100 degrees Celsius
Failed presupposition: SRtemperature;ε λd Celsius dð Þ¼100½ ð Þ λe:boil eð Þð Þ ,
"e boil eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 boil e
0ð Þ ^
ε λd Celsius dð Þ ¼ 100½ ð Þ temperature e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every boiling event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which
is a boiling event whose temperature is very low compared with 100
degrees Celsius.)
These presuppositions fail because the subevents of a driving event typically
have the same speed as that event, and similarly for the subevents of boiling
events and their temperatures.
Since stratified reference is presupposed to hold of verb phrases, it is not
surprising that specific verb phrases can rescue constructions that would other-
wise be unacceptable, as in the case of temperature-based for-adverbials. For the
following example, which is modeled on (36), I assume that the relevant mea-
sure function, which I write temperature-drop, maps any cooling event to the
number of degrees that it causes the temperature to drop.
4 Attested example, from Daubert and Clarke (1944).
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(39) cool for five degrees
Satisfied presupposition: SRtemperature-drop;ε λd Celsius dð Þ¼5½ ð Þ λe:cool eð Þð Þ ,
"e cool eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 cool e
0ð Þ ^
ε λd Celsius dð Þ ¼ 5½ ð Þ temperature-drop e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every cooling event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which
is a cooling event that involves a temperature drop whose extent is very
small compared with five degrees Celsius.)
On the plausible assumption that every cooling process causes the temperature
of the affected entity to drop continuously, this presupposition is satisfied.
It seems reasonable to assume that the same presupposition that is
found in for-adverbials is also found in pseudopartitives. The intuition here
is that a for-adverbial construction like run for three hours has essentially the
same semantics as the corresponding pseudopartitive construction three hours
of running, and that it gives rise to the same presupposition. In substance-
denoting pseudopartitives, I assume that the dimension parameter is set to the
appropriate measure function. For example, in thirty liters of water, this mea-
sure function is volume, and the resulting presupposition is plausibly satisfied:
(40) thirty liters of water
Satisfied presupposition: SRvolume;ε λd liters dð Þ¼30½ ð Þ λx:water xð Þð Þ ,
"x water xð Þ ! x 2  λy water yð Þ ^
ε λd liters dð Þ ¼ 30½ ð Þ volume yð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every amount of water can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is
an amount of water whose volume is very small compared with thirty liters.)
Mass nouns like water (as we have just seen) and plural count nouns like books
are acceptable on the plausible assumption that they have approximate divisive
reference (Link 1983; Krifka 1998): Whenever they apply to an entity, they also
apply to all of its parts (leaving aside very small parts). By contrast, singular
count nouns are ruled out on the assumption that they are quantized (that is,
they do not apply to any proper parts of any entity to which they apply), as
proposed by Krifka (1998). This is shown in the following example:
(41) *five pounds of book
Failed presupposition: SRweight;ε λd pounds dð Þ¼5½ ð Þ λx:book xð Þð Þ ,
"x book xð Þ ! x 2  λy book yð Þ ^
ε λd pounds dð Þ ¼ 5½ ð Þ weight yð Þð Þ
  
(Every book can be divided into one or more parts, each of which is a
book whose weight is very small compared with five pounds.)
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The presupposition in (41) fails for two reasons: (i) typically, a book’s weight is
not very small compared with five pounds, so we cannot read the “one or more
parts” as “one part”; (ii) a book does not consist of proper parts which are
themselves books, so we cannot read the “one or more parts” as “two or more
parts”. The assumption that singular count nouns are quantized rules out the
possibility that a book has any parts besides itself, and therefore a fortiori it is
not possible for any part of a book to be very small in weight compared with the
weight of the book itself. (In many cases we could even use the weaker assump-
tion that it may be that a book does have mereological parts—its spine, for
example—but that in that case none of these parts qualifies as a book.)
Expressions such as (42) are ruled out as well if book is interpreted as a
count noun, though they are ruled out for a different reason than (41) is.
(42) *five tons of book
Let us assume (plausibly) that every book’s weight is very small compared with
five tons. Therefore it will always be possible to divide every book into one or
more parts (namely into one part) whose weight is very small compared with five
tons. So reason (i) is now no longer relevant, and the presupposition of this
expression is actually satisfied. The reason (42) is ruled out is its at-issue
meaning. Following Schwarzschild (2006) and others, I assume that pseudopar-
titives are interpreted intersectively. This means that (42) denotes the intersec-
tion of the set of books with the set of objects whose weight is five tons. But this
intersection is empty, because by assumption no book weighs five tons. Hence (42)
does not hold of any object and this explains its deviance.
Turning to the problematic example of the snow that fell on Berlin, it can be
given an account as follows:
(43) five feet of snow
Satisfied presupposition: SRheight;ε λd feet dð Þ¼5½ ð Þ λx:snow xð Þð Þ ,
"x snow xð Þ ! x 2  λy snow yð Þ ^
ε λd feet dð Þ ¼ 5½ ð Þ height yð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every amount of snow can be divided into one or more parts (horizontal
layers), each of which is an amount of snow whose height is very small
compared with five feet.)
This presupposition is satisfied in the Berlin scenario because horizontal layers
of snow can play the role of the parts. The presupposition does not require
height to be monotonic, so the example is acceptable in spite of the fact that the
snow on West Berlin and the snow on East Berlin have the same height as the
snow that fell on Berlin as a whole.
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The idea behind this account can again be understood via the visual
metaphor introduced in Section 1. A plural or mass entity to which a pseudo-
partitive applies is divided into strata which are very small as measured in the
dimension determined by the pseudopartitive, but may extend arbitrarily in
other dimensions. These strata are then required to be in the denotation of the
noun. Singular count nouns always fail this test because the individuals in their
denotation are atomic, and cannot be further subdivided into strata. Figure 3
illustrates what (43) expresses formally: The measure function height is accep-
table in the pseudopartitive five feet of snow because every amount of snow can
be divided into parts (horizontal layers) of snow whose height is very small
compared to five feet.
Like previous accounts, we still rule out examples involving temperature and
similar intensive measure functions:
(44) *thirty degrees Celsius of water
Failed presupposition: SRtemperature;ε λd Celsius dð Þ¼5½ ð Þ λx:water xð Þð Þ ,
"x water xð Þ ! x 2  λy water yð Þ ^
ε λd Celsius dð Þ ¼ 30½ ð Þ temperature yð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every amount of water can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is an amount of water whose temperature is very low compared
with thirty degrees Celsius.)
This presupposition fails as desired since the parts of a given amount of water









West Berlin East Berlin
Figure 3: Accepting five feet of
snow.
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takes the substance noun into account, so we correctly predict the contrast
between unacceptable cases like (30c) (*five degrees (Celsius) of water) and
acceptable cases like (32) (two degrees of global warming). I assume that the
measure function relevant in (32), which I write temperature-increase, maps any
warming event to the number of degrees of warming that it causes.
(45) two degrees Celsius of global warming
Satisfied presupposition:
SRtemperature-increase;ε λd Celsius dð Þ¼2½ ð Þ λe:global:warming eð Þð Þ ,
"e½global:warming eð Þ !
e 2  λe0 global:warming e
0ð Þ ^
ε λd Celsius dð Þ ¼ 2½ ð Þ temperature-increase e0ð Þð Þ
!#
(Every amount of global warming can be divided into one or more parts,
each of which is an amount of global warming that is very low compared
with two degrees Celsius.)
The granularity parameter of stratified reference alsomakes it natural to account for
an observation by Bale (2009): Pseudopartitives that are used to talk about very
small quantities accept mass nouns but reject count nouns. A pseudopartitive as a
whole cannot be predicated of an entity that is too small to be in the denotation of
the substance noun. This is shown by the following examples. As discussed above,
I assume that pseudopartitives are incompatible with singular count nouns because
these nouns are quantized and this leads to a failure of the stratified reference
presupposition. So whenever the word occurs in the singular, it is the mass sense of
the word apple (which denotes portions of apple, that is, applesauce or apple slices)
which is at play here. As for apples, it denotes the plural of the count noun apple
rather than of the mass noun apple, because mass nouns cannot be pluralized. The
semantics of plural formation can be represented using the star operator (e.g. Link
1983). This means that portions of apple do not enter the extension of apples
because they are not in the denotation of the singular count noun, and because
the star operator closes predicates under sum but not under parthood.
(46) a. Give me 500 grams of apple/apples.
b. Give me 100 grams of apple/?apples.
c. Give me one gram of apple/??apples.
The status of examples (46b) and (46c) can be accounted for through the vague
predicate ε, on the assumption that the weight of a typical apple qualifies as
very small in comparison with 500 grams but not in comparison with one gram,
and that 100 grams is a borderline case.
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The difference between mass and count uses of apple is also shown in the
following attested example:
(47) Lee said Americans eat the equivalent of one-fifth of a fresh apple each day,
or about 19.7 pounds a year. But they should eat five times that much – at
least one apple a day, he said. The Cornell researchers found that just
100 grams of apple have the same antioxidant activity as 1,500 milligrams
of Vitamin C. (The average apple weighs 150 grams, or about 5 ounces.)5
This example becomes worse if the substance noun in 100 grams of apple is replaced
by apples. Intuitively, this substitution has the effect that the example is now about
whole apples instead of portions of apple. Stratified reference predicts this fact on
the assumption that the weight of the smallest apples is not very small compared to
100 grams, let alone compared to one gram. But the weight of applesauce (that is, of
stuff that qualifies as apple in themass sense) can be very small down tomilligrams.
A similar pattern can be observed in the following squish (Eytan Zweig, p.c):
(48) a. *twelve pounds of twelve-pound weights
b. ?twelve pounds of six-pound weights
c. twelve pounds of four-pound weights
d. twelve pounds of three-pound weights
e. twelve pounds of two-pound weights
f. twelve pounds of one-pound weights
This account predicts that sentences (48a) through (48f) are only acceptable to
the extent that the presupposition in (49) is satisfied. Here I write n-pound-
weights to abbreviate the pluralized predicates denoted by twelve-pound weights,
six-pound weights, etc. corresponding to the examples in (48).
(49) twelve pounds of n-pound weights
Presupposition: SRweight;ε λd pounds dð Þ¼12½ ð Þ λx:n-pound-weights xð Þð Þ ,
"x n-pound‐weights xð Þ ! x 2  λy n-pound-weights yð Þ ^
ε λd pounds dð Þ ¼ 12½ ð Þ weight yð Þð Þ
  
(Every sum of one or more n-pound weights can be divided into one or
more parts, each of which is a sum of one or more n-pound weights whose
combined weight is very small compared with twelve pounds.)
5 Attested example (http://www.fowlerfarms.com/apple_a_day.htm).
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In other words, the pseudopartitives in (48) presuppose that every sum consist-
ing of one or more n-pound weights consists of n-pound weights that weigh
much less than twelve pounds. Whether this will turn out to be true, false, or
borderline depends on the choice of n.
To summarize, we can characterize the class of admissible measure functions
as follows: A pseudopartitive has to satisfy stratified reference, where the dimen-
sion parameter is specified by the measure function and the granularity parameter
is specified based on the measure phrase of the pseudopartitive. The constraint on
measure functions is also instantiated in true partitives, comparative determiners,
for-adverbials, and other constructions. An event pseudopartitive like three hours
of running is given the same analysis as a for-adverbial like run for three hours.
This explains why the two constructions also license the same measure functions.
The constraint that rules out intensive measure functions like temperature pro-
posed by Krifka (1998) and Schwarzschild (2006) is subsumed by the same
constraint that also prevents telic predicates from combining with for-adverbials.
In this section, I have exploited one of the defining features of stratified
reference, namely that it pushes us towards thinking of unboundedness as
relativized to a certain dimension, thematic role, or measure function. The
example five feet of snow has played the same role as the example push carts
to the store above. Both examples force us to consider two dimensions at once:
height and width in the first case, time and space in the second. The insight from
Schwarzschild (2006) that the constraint that comes with five feet of snow must
be checked on horizontal layers of snow rather than on every subregion of snow
finds a natural explanation in this framework.
4 Distributivity and collectivity
The traditional view on for-adverbials and aspect, as we have seen in Section 2,
is that the contribution of for an hour can roughly be paraphrased as at each
subinterval within an hour and that this is only compatible with atelic predicates.
Stratified reference generalizes this view in various ways. The paraphrase
contains the word each, which suggests that there may be a connection between
atelicity and distributivity. In this section I establish such a connection, and
I show that the collective-distributive opposition can be formally related to the
telic-atelic opposition. Concretely, I use stratified reference in two ways: first, in
order to formulate meaning postulates that capture distributivity, and second, in
order to model a distinction within the class of collective predicates.
As is frequently done, I understand “distributivity”, and its opposite “col-
lectivity”, as properties of predicates. For example, predicates like smile, see,
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run, breathe and so on are distributive; predicates like be numerous, be a good
team, gather, meet, disperse, hold hands and so on are collective. Distributive
predicates give rise to what will be called distributive entailments from pluralities
to individuals; for example, (50a) entails (50b).
(50) a. John and Mary smiled.
b. John smiled and Mary smiled.
Collective predicates lack these entailments, or give rise to them in a different
way. I come back to this point below. For a general introduction to distributivity
and collectivity, see also Champollion (to appear(a)).
It has often been suggested that the distributive-collective opposition can be
captured by formulating meaning postulates for distributive predicates (e.g.
Scha 1981), at least as far as lexical (non-complex) predicates are involved
(Winter 2001: Ch. 6). Meaning postulates need to be formulated in somewhat
different ways depending on whether or not events are involved. In semantic
frameworks that lack events, a meaning postulate for a distributive predicate
like smile could state that whenever smile applies to a plurality of people, it also
applies to each of them. In event semantics, a predicate like smile does not
directly apply to the smilers, but to the associated smiling events instead. This
raises the question of how best to formulate distributivity-related meaning
postulates in event semantics.
I suggest that stratified reference is well-suited for this purpose because of the
parameters it provides. Its dimension parameter can be set to “agent” in order to
access the smilers via the smiling events. More generally, this parameter can be used
to relativize the notion of distributivity to a given argument position. Predicateswith
multiple argument positions may be distributive on all, some, or none of these
positions (Lasersohn 1988; Landman 1996). For example, the verb see is distributive
on both its agent and theme positions, since it follows both from John andMary saw
Bill and from John saw Bill and Sue that John saw Bill. By contrast, the verb kill is
distributive only on its theme role but not on its agent role, as the following scenario
shows. The two outlaws Bonnie and Clyde were killed by a posse of six police
officers, which included Sheriff Jordan. Given this background knowledge, (51a)
entails (51b) but does not entail (51c). More generally, whenever a group of people is
killed then each of them is killed, but a group of people can kill a person without it
being the case that each of them kills that person.
(51) a. The police officers killed Bonnie and Clyde.
b. ) The police officers killed Bonnie.
c. 6) Sheriff Jordan killed Bonnie and Clyde.
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I have shown in previous sections how the dimension parameter of stratified
reference can be used to model the distinction between temporal and spatial for-
adverbials, and the different measure functions in pseudopartitives. For the
present purpose, I propose to instantiate this parameter with different thematic
roles. This is in keeping with the visual metaphor I introduced at the beginning
of this paper, where a thematic role is just another dimension of the abstract
space in which events live. We can see a (temporally) atelic predicate as a
predicate that is distributive with respect to time. Similarly, we can see a
distributive predicate as one that has stratified reference on the appropriate
thematic position. I propose to capture lexical distributivity in event semantics
by meaning postulates such as the following:
(52) Meaning postulate: smile is distributive on its agent position
SRagent;Atom λe:smile eð Þð Þ ,
"e smile eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 smile e
0ð Þ ^
Atom agent e0ð Þð Þ
  
(Every smiling event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which
is a smiling event whose agent is atomic.)
This meaning postulate can be read as follows. Whenever there is a smiling
event e, then that event consists of one or more smiling events e′ whose agents
are mereological atoms (that is, they have no proper parts). For example, if e is
an event in which John and Bill smile, then that event consists of two smiling
events whose agents are atoms. From this, and from the assumption that John
and Bill are atoms, it follows that John smiled and that Bill smiled.
We can capture the difference between the agent and theme role of kill by
adopting a meaning postulate analogous to (52) only for the theme position of
that verb and by refraining from adopting it for the agent position. In other
words, distributivity on a given argument position is stratified reference on the
dimension specified by the thematic role of that argument position.
Collective predicates, such as (be) numerous, (be a) couple, gather, meet, or
hold hands, do not satisfy stratified reference on the thematic role of their
subjects, because none of the atomic parts of these subjects participate in events
that satisfy these predicates. For example, if John and Mary are a couple then it
does not follow that John is a couple. This can be modeled by refraining from
adopting distributivity meaning postulates for these predicates, or by adopting
negated versions of these postulates.
However, it may still be useful to apply a modified form of such meaning
postulates to a subset of collective predicates. The view of distributivity as
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stratified reference suggests that not only the dimension parameter but also the
granularity parameter should have a role to play. This is indeed the case: it can
be used to specify “how distributive” a given predicate is on a given argument
position, for example whether it distributes all the way down to atoms or only to
small but nonatomic entities.
Take for example the case of gather. Although this predicate is collective
and not distributive, it still licenses entailments from larger to smaller numbers
in ways that are reminiscent of a distributive predicate. For example, if A, B, and
C gather, this entails that A and B gather, that A and C gather, and that B and C
gather. More generally, the predicate gather licenses entailments from pluralities
of cardinality n to subpluralities of size n–1, n–2, and so on, down to 2. By
contrast, other collective predicates, such as be numerous or be a good team, do
not license this kind of entailment, since two people do not count as being
numerous and since two people taken from a good team do not typically form a
team by themselves (except when the good team consists of only these two
people to begin with, as in tennis). These differences can be modeled by the
granularity parameter of stratified reference. For example, gather satisfies the
following meaning postulate (I use jxj for the number of atomic parts of x):
(53) Meaning postulate for gather
SRagent;λx:jxj¼2 λe:gather eð Þð Þ ,
"e gather eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 gather e
0ð Þ ^
jagent e0ð Þj ¼ 2
  
(Every gathering event can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is a gathering event whose agent is two people.)
The same kind of meaning postulate also holds of some other collective predi-
cates, such as meet and hold hands. For example, if there is an event of ten people
standing in a circle and holding hands, this event can be divided into parts in
such a way that each part involves two people who stand next to each other. Each
such part is then an event in which two people hold hands. Other collective
predicates, such as be numerous and be a good team, do not satisfy this condition.
Kuhn (2014), building in part on Champollion (2010: Ch. 9), suggests that this
distinction within the class of collective predicates might be linguistically relevant
in connection with the behavior of the determiner all. As has often been observed,
all rejects certain collective predicates, some of which involve cardinality checks,
such as be numerous, be a group of five, or be a good team; but it is compatible
with other collective predicates, some of which involve collective action, such as
gather, meet, hold hands, and be similar (e.g. Kroch 1974; Dowty 1987; Moltmann
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1997). With respect to the first class, all patterns with distributive determiners such
as each, a fact that justifies treating all as a distributive determiner, as shown in
(54). With respect to the second class, however, all and each come apart, as shown
in (55). I refer to this as the numerous-gather opposition. In the terminology of
Winter (2001: Ch. 5), numerous-type predicates are grouped together with distri-
butive predicates to form the category of “atom predicates”, and gather-type
predicates correspond to the category of “set predicates”.
(54) a. *All the students who came to the rally are numerous.
b. *Each of the students who came to the rally is numerous.
(55) a. All the students {met / gathered in the hallway / held hands}.
b. *Each of the students {met / gathered in the hallway / held hands}.
This set of facts is just part of a more complex pattern of phenomena that
involve the numerous-gather opposition, as described and analyzed in detail
by Winter. First, the pattern can be generalized from all to strong quantifiers, as
in (56). Second, the pattern breaks down for some speakers and predicates when
the noun in question is replaced by a group noun (57).
(56) *Most of the students who came to the rally were numerous.
(57) All the groups of demonstrators were numerous.
Stratified reference helps capture the relevant semantic distinction involved
between the two kinds of collective predicates illustrated above. I focus on
(54) and (55) and I set aside (56) and (57) for the purpose of this paper. A full
discussion and an extension of the present theory to the latter cases can be
found in Champollion (2010: Ch. 9) and in Champollion (to appear(b)), as well as
a comparison of the present theory with Winter’s and other proposals.
I will build on the following basic idea. Distributive predicates have stratified
reference down to atoms. Collective predicates like gather, meet, hold hands, and
be similar are “almost distributive” in that they distribute down to entities of
cardinality 2. That is, they have stratified reference with granularity parameter 2,
as stated in (53) for the case of gather. Other collective predicates like be numer-
ous, be a group of five, or be the team that won the tournament are more similar to
quantized predicates, in that they do not distribute down at all.
Suppose now that each and all impose stratified-reference requirements that
are similar to those imposed by for-adverbials and pseudopartitives, but that
they set their parameters in different ways. The dimension parameter is the
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relevant thematic role, and the granularity parameter is either set to Atom in the
case of each, or to some low cardinality value in the case of all. That is, the two
determiners have the entries in (58) and (59) and their presuppositions expand
as in (60) and (61). I write *agent(e) for the sum of the agents of the parts of e. I
will reuse ε as a placeholder for whatever turns out to be the granularity of all.
(In the examples we have seen so far, there may be no need for the vagueness of
ε, as we might simply set the threshold to cardinality 2. But in the general case, a
vague notion will be necessary since all can also combine with mass terms as in
All the milk is sour, in which case cardinality is not an applicable notion, cf.
Dobrovie-Sorin (2014).) Concretely, I will assume that ε can combine with a set
of numbers and with an entity (in this case, the type of ε is nt; eth i), and that
given this combination of arguments it checks whether the number of atomic
parts of the entity is much smaller than the average of the numbers in the set. (In
what follows, there will be only one number in the set, so the averaging step will
turn out to be trivial.) The following entries are only adequate for the case where
all or each occur in agent position and together with a plural count noun. In
other cases, agent would need to be replaced by the appropriate thematic role,
which could easily be modeled by abstracting over it. To account for the case in
which all modifies a mass noun, ε will need to be generalized appropriately. I
will not do any of this here in order to keep the account simple.
(58) each of theð Þ NP½ ½ ½  ¼
λPλe : SRagent; Atom Pð Þ: P eð Þ ^ agent eð Þ¼ ¯NP½ 
(59) all the NP½ ½ ½  ¼
λPλe : SRagent;ε λn:n¼j¯ NPjð Þ Pð Þ: P eð Þ ^ agent eð Þ¼ ¯NP½ 
(60) Presupposition of each:
"e VP eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 VP e
0ð Þ ^
Atom agent e0ð Þð Þ
  
(Every VPing event e consists of one or more VPing events whose agents
are atoms.)
(61) Presupposition of all:
"e VP eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 VP e
0ð Þ ^
ε λn:n ¼ j¯NPjð Þ agent e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every VPing event e consists of one or more VPing events whose agents
are very small in number compared to the number of atomic parts of
the NP.)
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Given these assumptions, distributive predicates like smile as well as certain
collective predicates (e.g. gather, hold hands) will satisfy the presupposition of
all (Kuhn 2014). For example, when a group smiles, every one of its subgroups
smiles, as does every one of its members; when a group gathers, every one of its
subgroups gathers, though its individual members do not gather. For smile, this
is shown in (62). For gather, this is shown in (63).
(62) all the children smiled
Satisfied presupposition: SRagent;ε λn:n¼j¯ childjð Þ λe:smile eð Þð Þ ,
"e smile eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 smile e
0ð Þ ^
ε λn:n ¼ j¯ childjð Þ agent e0ð Þð Þ
 !" #
(Every smiling event can be divided into one or more parts, each of which
is a smiling event whose agents are very small in number compared with
the total number of children.)
(63) all the children gathered
Satisfied presupposition: SRagent;ε λn:n¼j¯ childjð Þ λe:gather eð Þð Þ ,
"e gather eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 gather e
0ð Þ ^
ε λn:n ¼ j¯ childjð Þ agent e0ð Þð Þ
  
(Every gathering event can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is a gathering event whose agents are very small in number com-
pared with the total number of children.)
However, those collective predicates that do not have stratified reference
down to any level will not satisfy the presupposition of all. Here is one
example:
(64) *all the ants (in my kitchen) are numerous
Failed presupposition: SRparticipant;ε λn:n¼j¯ antjð Þ λe:numerous eð Þð Þ ,
"e numerous eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 numerous e
0ð Þ ^
ε λn:n ¼ j¯ antjð Þ participant e0ð Þð Þ
  
(Every state of being numerous can be divided into one or more parts,
each of which is a state of being numerous whose participants are
very small in number compared with the total number of ants in my
kitchen.)
As for each, only distributive predicates will satisfy its presupposition. Even a
collective predicate that has stratified reference down to granularity level 2,
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like meet, will not satisfy the more stringent granularity-level 1 requirement
of each:
(65) *each of the children met
Failed presupposition: SRagent;Atom λe:meet eð Þð Þ ,
"e meet eð Þ ! e 2  λe0 meet e
0ð Þ ^
Atom agent e0ð Þð Þ
  
(Every meeting event can be divided into one or more parts, each of
which is a meeting event whose agent is an atom.)
Stratified reference does not require that the predicate in question applies to all
parts whose agent is small in the relevant way, only that there be some way of
dividing the whole event into such parts. This nonexhaustive way in which strati-
fied reference distributes the predicate is what allowed us to treat cases like five feet
of snow. In the case of all, it predicts that there should be cases where not every
small subevent is relevant. As noted by Kuhn (2014), this prediction is true:
(66) a. All the pieces of the puzzle fit together.
b. All the boys in the circle held hands.
In scenarios that make these sentences true, the predicates fit together and hold
hands do not necessarily apply to all pairs, but only to pairs of adjacent pieces
or boys. This is compatible with these predicates having stratified reference
down to granularity level 2.
To summarize this section, all is an “almost distributive” determiner: it
requires distributivity down to a small granularity level, but not all the way
down to atoms. Gather-type predicates are “a bit distributive”; numerous-type
predicates are not. In keeping with the broader picture in Champollion (2010),
the telic-atelic opposition can be formally related to the collective-distributive
opposition. To explain why gather distinguishes between each and all, I have
followed Kuhn (2014) in suggesting that each distributes over events with atomic
individuals while all distributes over events whose agents must be small in
number but need not be atomic.
A final remark on the notion that what sets gather-type predicates apart
within the class of collective predicates is that they distribute down to elements
of size 2. This basic idea is taken in essence from Kuhn (2014) and represents a
slight departure from Champollion (2010), where I assumed instead that collec-
tive predicates technically never distribute and that gather-type—but not
numerous-type—collective predicates have groups as agents, where groups are
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mereologically atomic entities that formally model plural individuals and that
give rise to certain kinds of entailments about themselves involving collective
action or collective responsibility (Landman 1989, 1996). The atomic nature of
groups made sure that the stratified reference requirement was always vacu-
ously satisfied. One problem with that view was that it did not capture the
inferences from A, B, and C gathered to A and B gathered. Another problem was
that Landman and myself only gave a partial list of what constitutes collective
entailments. What the present account has in common with Champollion (2010),
however, is the idea that all imposes stratified reference just like each (though
with different granularity parameter settings), and that both can therefore be
seen as distributive items.
5 Conclusion and outlook
I have introduced a parametrized higher-order property, stratified reference, and
used it to characterize a wide range of semantic oppositions: telic vs. atelic,
singular vs. plural, count vs. mass, intensive vs. extensive, collective vs. distribu-
tive, and numerous-type collective vs. gather-type collective. I have claimed that
stratified reference formalizes the bounded vs. unbounded opposition, which I
have suggested as a way to subsume these semantic oppositions. Unboundedness
corresponds to stratified reference, boundedness corresponds to lack of it. This has
led to new answers to old questions, such as why for-adverbials reject telic
predicates, why pseudopartitives reject singular count nouns and certain measure
functions, and why each and (to some extent) all reject collective predicates. I have
suggested that all these constructions impose a parametrized but otherwise iden-
tical requirement on one of their arguments, and that stratified reference is well
suited to capture this requirement. In the rest of this paper, I sketch some broader
implications of the present theory and connections to other domains of linguistics.
I have focused on characterizing the properties of predicates that typically
consist of a single word. As for complex predicates (e.g. see thirty zebras), they
too can be characterized as telic, atelic, distributive, collective, and so on. While
stratified reference is useful for this purpose as well, a full account of aspect and
distributivity in these cases will need to be complemented by a theory of how a
given complex predicate ends up having or not having stratified reference.
For example, the distributive-collective opposition also applies to complex
predicates such as wear a dress (distributive), share a pizza (collective), and carry
the piano upstairs (mixed distributive/collective). Phrasal predicates like wear a
dress can acquire distributivity through a covert VP-level distributivity operator
whose meaning is a matter of debate. Either it distributes the predicate it modifies
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over atoms, similar to adverbial each (Link 1991; Winter 2001: Ch. 6), or it
distributes them over salient nonatomic entities (Schwarzschild 1996: Ch. 5).
Distributivity operators, whether covert or overt, can be reformulated in ways
that are very similar to stratified reference. The difference between atomic and
nonatomic distributivity can then be recast as a difference in settings of the
granularity parameter of stratified reference (Champollion 2014a, 2014b). Certain
overt modifiers, such as adverbial each and together, can also determine whether
the predicate that they modify is understood distributively or collectively.
Stratified reference allows us to think about the effect of each, together and
distributivity operators and about aspectual composition as two sides of the
same coin. The question of how complex predicates end up being collective or
distributive is analogous to the question of how complex predicates end up being
atelic or telic, a process also known as aspectual composition (e.g. Krifka 1998).
This also means that we can link problems that affect accounts of these
processes. For example, certain apparently nonquantized predicates like eat
something, eat less than three apples, and drink a quantity of wine empirically
pattern with telic predicates, which present a challenge for algebraic accounts of
aspect including mine (Zucchi and White 2001). Similarly, a number of collective
predicates that are incompatible with all, such as be a group of less than five,
would be expected to be compatible with all under the account I have discussed
here (Kuhn 2014). I am not claiming to have a solution for these problems, only
suggesting that if a solution to them in one domain emerges, we may well be
able to adapt it to the other domain.
The overarching theme of this paper is the strengthening of semantic rela-
tionships and parallels that hold across the nominal and verbal domain. A
natural question to ask is whether the common semantics I have suggested
goes hand in hand with a common syntax. For example, the basic constituent
structure of for-adverbials is generally accepted as something like [V [for [three
hours]]]) where V is the label of the verbal projection that the for-adverbial
modifies. But there is no consensus on the constituent structure of pseudoparti-
tives. One possibility, which is in line with the intersective semantics of pseu-
dopartitives I have assumed, is that the measure noun of a measure
pseudopartitive forms a constituent with the determiner that precedes it, as in
[[two pounds] [of tomatoes]] (Akmajian and Lehrer 1976; Guéron 1979; Gawron
2002; Schwarzschild 2002, 2006). An alternative to this analysis is the right-
branching structure [two [pounds [of tomatoes]]] (Stickney 2008; Bale 2009;
Scontras 2014). It is also possible that the two structures correspond to two
different readings (Landman 2004; Rothstein 2009). It would not be difficult to
formulate the semantic account presented here in a way that is consistent
with either structure. However, only the first structure is analogous to the
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for-adverbial and therefore reflects the semantic parallel between pseudoparti-
tives and other distributive constructions.
The theory developed in this article is deeply connected with the algebraic
semantic framework developed for the modeling of measuring-out and bound-
edness in Krifka (1998). Just like that framework, the present theory has poten-
tial applications in morphosyntax. For example, it may help explain how
boundedness is marked by semantic case in Finnish (Krifka 1992; Kiparsky
1998), by perfective prefixes in Slavic (Filip 2000), and by accusative adverbials
in Korean (Wechsler and Lee 1996).
Throughout this paper, I have assumed that singular count nouns are inter-
preted as involving reference to singular entities but not sums. This was necessary
in order to explain the contrast between five pounds of books and *five pounds of
book, and it is justified in English by the corresponding contrast in numeral
phrases (five books vs. *five book). Other languages, like Hungarian and Turkish,
require nouns to be morphologically singular when they combine with numerals,
and also when they are used as substance nouns in pseudopartitives. From the
point of view of the present theory, this leads to the view that singular nouns in
these languages and constructions can be interpreted as involving reference to
sums. Theories that adopt this view (Farkas and de Swart 2010; Bale et al. 2011)
are compatible with the view developed here. This may be seen as an advantage
for them over theories that reject this assumption (Ionin and Matushansky 2006).
While I have shown that the behavior of a large number of constructions can
be reduced to one principle (sensitivity to stratified reference), the question
arises why this principle exists and why these constructions are sensitive to it.
In formal semantics, this is not the kind of question that is typically answered,
or perhaps even answerable. There is no agreement on whether it even needs to
be answered. On the one hand, for the purposes of comparing formal semantic
theories to each other, formal semantics usually pays attention to something
similar to Chomskyan explanatory adequacy: “If a number of highly complex
and apparently unrelated facts are reducible to a few simple principles, then
these principles explain these facts” (von Stechow 1984). On the other hand, we
need not confine ourselves in this way: “we can seek a level of explanation
deeper than explanatory adequacy, asking not only what the properties of
language are but also why they are that way” (Chomsky 2001).
I do not know why there should be any constructions in language, let alone so
many of them, that are sensitive to stratified reference or to the various properties
it captures. To answer this question, it may be worth looking for explanations in
domains other than formal semantics, such as first-language acquisition. Stratified
reference may conceivably help first-language learners distinguish the functions
of different constructions. For example, learners must distinguish constructions
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that specify the quantity of a substance or event, such as pseudopartitives, from
superficially similar constructions that specify non-quantity-related properties,
such as attributive constructions (three-pound strawberries). Attributive construc-
tions do not impose stratified reference and are therefore compatible with inten-
sive measure functions, as illustrated by three-degree water (Schwarzschild 2006).
Apart from sometimes misinterpreting the number word in pseudopartitives as
referring to cardinality of a relevant set of objects, four-year-olds tend to correctly
distinguish pseudopartitives from attributives (Syrett 2013). Similarly, various
studies have suggested that children are sensitive to the atelic-telic opposition
as early as three years old, raising the question of how much of it is innately
specified (Crain 2011). If something like the boundedness-unboundedness opposi-
tion is among the building blocks of the language faculty, then we might expect
that children access it early on, and possibly that a child will learn different
constructions that involve this building block at the same age.
Another kind of explanation, as well as another avenue for further research,
may be found in linguistic theories that study conceptual linguistic knowledge
and the mental patterns and representations in which it is organized, such as
cognitive semantics (Talmy 2011) and conceptual semantics (Jackendoff 1996).
The metaphor I have used to explain stratified reference, namely that indivi-
duals, substances, and events occupy regions in an abstract space whose
dimensions include thematic roles and measure functions as well as spatial
and temporal dimensions, is reminiscent of the theory of conceptual spaces in
Gärdenfors (2007). The words that introduce stratified reference constraints,
such as for, until, of, each and all, belong to closed-class categories such as
prepositions and determiners. Cognitive semantics has found that closed-class
categories are highly constrained in the range of conceptual categories they can
express. The relevant conceptual category in this case would be boundedness.
While cognitive semantics is sometimes seen as opposed to formal semantics,
this does not have to be so (Krifka 1998; Zwarts and Verkuyl 1994). We can make
use of formal semantic techniques such as the ones I have developed here, and
assume that expressions are interpreted by elements of conceptual structures
rather than entities in the real world. The present system may then be seen as a
step towards a model-theoretic characterization of such frameworks.
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List of symbols used
ε a predicate that encodes what it means to be very small
μ a measure function
σ the spatial extent function
τ the runtime function (“temporal trace”)
¯ the mereological sum operator
 mereological parthood
* the algebraic closure operator
jxj the number of atomic parts of x
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